2021 November-December Highlights: Essays on Western History

Pierce Kozlowski
Dec 31, 2021
12 min read

Tables of Contents:

Did Pythagoras Believe Numbers Were Sacred?
How Great was Alexander the Great?
Was Rome a True Democracy?
Did Cleopatra's Looks Make Her Successful?
Did Ceasar Want to be Called Emperor?

Pythagoras and Mathematics

By Pierce K. Kozlowski

Pythagoras (570-479 BCE), a “famed mathematician and philosopher,” was born on the Island of Samos, and posited that mathematics underpinned certain realities about nature.

Students of Pythagoras recorded most of his major teachings, and oddly enough, it is revealed in Diogenes’ Lives that he accumulated a cult-like following. Students of Pythagoras believed that his teachings were divine prophecy, and the students of Pythagoras were segregated into “Listeners” and “Mathematicians.”

Listeners listened to Pythagoras from behind a curtain, and mathematicians would study right next to him in person. In 490 BCE, Pythagoras died while visiting a friend after someone ignited the house they were in out of the fear that Pythagoras would come to power and enforce tyranny.

Pythagoras’ philosophy revolved around mathematics, and he postulated that all things in the natural world could be “predicted and measured” through mathematical principles and rhythmic measurements. Therefore, because mathematics explained the behavior of the natural world, it was inherently intertwined with life and nature itself. Consequently, Pythagoras then concluded that numbers were sacred.

Pythagoras also held a cyclical view of the cosmos, arguing that certain events repeat themselves on a set time and that the soul was immortal through modern, Buddhist notions of reincarnation.

References:

1. Fieser, J. "1: Presocratic Philosophy." 1: Presocratic Philosophy. University of Tennesse Martin, 19 Mar. 2013. Fri. 12 Nov. 2021.

Alexander the Great

By Pierce K. Kozlowski

What does great mean? In this context, great can have two definitions.

First, if great in this context means moral and virtuous, then Alexander the Great (336-323 BCE)—King of Macedonia and Conquer of the Persian Empire—is not great. Historically, a figure known for championing righteousness and moral virtue was Jesus Christ (5 BCE-28 AD). During Christ’s ministry, he declared that loving others as you love yourself was one of the most important commandments, and he instructed his followers to love their enemies (Matt. 22:39). However, it can be reasonably argued that Alexander the Great was the diametric opposite of such ‘moral’ teachings.

Alexander’s personal philosophy was probably more in line with Aristotle, who tutored

Alexander for three years, teaching him to “treat Greeks as friends, but [non-Greeks] as animals" (De Mauriac). This teaching would later materialize in Alexander’s conquest, where he was noted for harshness against the locals, especially in places like Persepolis. Diodorus Siculus (80–20 BCE)—a Greek historian of Agyrium—clearly points out this quality in Alexander in his History of the World: “[Alexander] was very hostile to the local people and did not trust them, and wished to destroy Persepolis utterly...” Alexander conquered territory after territory, pillaged multiple regions, and pursued battles ending in vicious blood baths. Based on those realities alone, Alexander doesn’t seem to possess any Christ-like, moral greatness. However, that is not to say that Alexander did not have some admirable qualities relating to honor and virtue.

When Alexander rose to the crown, his state, Macedonia, had been at war with Balkan factions. Thus, in 335 BCE, Alexander commenced the Balkan Campaign, marched towards and battled them, and won by an astounding margin. After the battle, Alexander sought to honor the warriors and soldiers who died under his command, commissioning statues in their memorial. Plutarch (46-119 CE)—a Greek Platonist, essayist, and biographer—highlighted Alexander’s nobility in Plutarch’s Lives: “Alexander had no more than thirty-four men killed, nine of which were the infantry. To bring honor to their memory, [Alexander] erected a statue to each of them in brass, the workmanship of Lysippus...” Alexander was not bereft of virtue, for he had an admirable loyalty and deep reverence towards his soldiers. However, at least against the moral example of Christ, Alexander’s character did not reflect moral greatness; and yet, great remains in the title of his name. As a result, this brings us to the second definition of great.

Was Alexander the Great, great? Yes. Okay, how and why?

Just as there is righteous greatness, there is non-righteous greatness. Non-righteous greatness can reflect aptitudes or talents which are not oriented towards moral virtues or ethical principles, and it is this type of greatness that characterizes Alexander the Great.

Alexander was a genius war strategist, a valiant leader, and fierce visionary. In particular,

Alexander was noted for his capacity to brilliantly motivate his troops. In August of 324 BCE,

Alexander delivered a speech to motivate his disheartened troops at Opis, Mesopotamia. Arrian (88-150 CE)—a Greek historian, military commander, and philosopher—recorded Alexander’s speech in The Campaigns of Alexander, which cites Alexander empathetically, but firmly saying to his troops, “I could not blame you for being the first to lose heart if I, your commander, had not shared in your exhausting marches and your perilous campaigns . . . But it is not so. You and I, gentlemen, have shared the labor and shared the danger, and the rewards are for us all.” Alexander averred, “The conquered territory belongs to you gentleman . . . already the great part of its treasure passes into your hands . . . The utmost hopes of riches or power which each one of you cherishes will be far surpassed, and whoever wishes to return home will be allowed to go, either with me or without me. I will make those who stay the envy of those who return.”

Alexander was an expert in pushing his troops through battle and pulling them through discouragement. Beyond that, however, Alexander had an even greater ‘talent’: Valiance, and the ability to disintegrate and conquer massive territories. Look no further than ancient map readings of Alexander’s empire. By 323 BCE, Alexander had already conquered part of the middle east, all of Egypt, and the entirety of the Persian Empire. Therefore, Alexander’s colossal empire comprised of Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Media, Parthia, Bactria, Persia, Afghanistan, Arachosia, and Sogdiana (Winkelman).

So, was Alexander truly great?

Morally and otherwise, no. Militarily, yes. The fruits of Alexander’s conquests are unmatched by any progress or pursuit of any military leader in history. Charles Freeze, Ph.D., echoes this very sentiment in his book in World History the Easy Way, and writes, “Alexander’s achievements as a military leader were remarkable. No general ever accomplished more. He also wanted to be seen as someone who would fuse the Greek world with other ‘Barbarian’ societies . . . He bears the name Great because many people feel he deserves to be remembered as one of history’s noble personalities that changed the world...” (Freeze)

For some, Freeze’s sentiment is a hot take. Even though it can be argued how Alexander wanted people to see him and whether he deserved the title of great, Freeze makes a broader point: It is a verifiable fact that Alexander ‘fused’ Greek and non-Greek societies and cultures. This positively connected the East and the West, opened new opportunities for trade, and unburdened the western world from the heavy rule of the Persian Empire (McLean). In addition to this successful conquest, Alexander never lost a war, he completed the conquest in just under 10 years, and accomplished all of this before his death at age 32, in 323 BCE.

That is why Alexander was Great. It was not because he was a righteous figure or a particularly ‘good’ person, worthy of moral praise; but because his demeanor, achievements, and the fruits of his conquests were unmatched by any person in the tapestry of human history.

References:

1. The Apostle, Matthew. “Matthew 22:37-40.” Bible Gateway, 85CE, www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2B5%3A44&version=NLT.

2. De Mauriac, Henry M. “Alexander the Great and the Politics of ‘Homonoia.’” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 10, no. 1, 1949, p. 104., doi:10.2307/2707202.

3. Scilius, Diodorus. History of the World. 30-60CE.

4. Plutarchus, Mestrius. Plutarch's Lives. 2CE.

5. Nicomedia, Arrian of. The Campaigns of Alexander. 336-323BCE.

6. Winkelman, Roy. “Map of the Empire of Alexander the Great, 323 BC.” FCIT, Florida Center for Instructional Technology , 2009, etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/800/849/849.htm.

7. Frazee, Charles A. World History the Easy Way. Barron's Educational Series, 1997.

8. McLean, Assistant Professor John. “Western Civilization.” Lumen, courses.lumenlearning.com/atd-herkimer-westerncivilization/chapter/alexanders-empire/.

Rome and Democracy

By Pierce K. Kozlowski

Was the Republic of Rome a true democracy?

Historical thinkers across time have argued that it was. Polybius (264–146 BCE), a historian from the Hellenistic era, suggested that Rome was a true democracy because the rule, in its entirety, was left to the people. Polybius wrote, “it is the people who bestow offices, which are the most honorable rewards of virtue . . . They also have the absolute power of passing or repealing laws; and most important of all, it is the people who deliberate on the question of peace and or war.” Professor Fergus Millar (1935-2019), an English academic historian, agreed with Polybius, and argued that “the most fundamental of all rights of the people [of Rome] was, however, the fact that they and they alone, could legislate.” On the basis of that reasoning, Millar thus determined that “the Roman res publica [had] to be characterized as a democracy.” However, in pursuit of answering the question on the legitimacy of Rome’s democratism, other historians have stepped forward, arguing the converse to the commonly held positions of Polybius and Millar.

Thinkers who have challenged how democratic Rome really was have pointed to the wild imbalances and faulty system that was the voting process in ancient Rome. Alan Ward (1935-2014), a historian from New Zealand, stands at the forefront of this case. When it came to voting accessibility, only people living within the “environs” of the Roman province were allowed to vote because “all voting had to be conducted in Rome.” Furthermore, Ward argued that poorer rural voters were disadvantaged in trial assemblies because “unit votes were already biased toward the wealthier property owners no matter how many voters showed up.” Ward goes on to cite American historian Ramsay MacMullen, who claimed that roughly 2% of the Roman population actually voted, rendering “any notion of direct democracy nugatory.” The truth about the despotic capacities of magistrates and tribunes were astronomical, further undercutting the representative scope of Rome’s democracy. Ward addressed this fact as well:

“The voters had no role in selecting candidates for office or in proposing legislation in any assembly. The presiding official...could reject the candidacy of someone whom he thought unworthy or unqualified. Similarly, Censors...could eject from the senate anyone who did not meet their standards or pleasure. Thus the senate, the magistrates, and the tribunes remained firmly in the hands of the elite. At the same time…[they] were the only ones who could place legislation before the voters.”

Sure, the notion of Rome and its people working in harmony with a perfect democracy is a beautiful one. However, the reality remains: Rome had a voting process which acted as an obstacle to democracy, and this is demonstrated by the voter turnout being only 2% of the region’s population. Rome’s government was loosely built upon the framework of pure democratism; however, internal issues within its voting system acted as a handicap to that framework, narrowing the capacity for Roman citizens to actually vote. Therefore, based on this line of reasoning, it can be reasonably argued that Rome was not a pure democracy.

References:

1. Polybius. The Histories. 167-119 BCE

2. Millar, Fergus. The Crowd in the Late Republic. 1998

3. Ward, Alan. “How Democratic was the Roman Republic?” 2003

Cleopatra and Political Success

By Pierce K. Kozlowski

It has been widely debated as to how much influence, exactly, Cleopatra’s physical beauty had over her political success. Cassius Dio (164-230 C.E.)—a wealthy Greek consul, author, and historian—argued that Cleopatra was a “woman of surpassing beauty,” and that she “possessed a most charming voice and a knowledge of how to make herself agreeable to everyone.” Dio went on to suggest that those very qualities aided Cleopatra in her social-political pursuits, even helping her win over the heart of the fearsome Julius Caesar. Dio’s position on the true awe and influence of Cleopatra’s beauty, however, has been widely contested by varying intellectuals across time.

Plutarch (50-120 C.E.)—a biographer, historian, and famous Greco-Roman author—argued that Cleopatra’s physical beauty was not as astounding or “surpassing” as Dio claimed. She was, according to Plutarch, “not altogether incomparable, nor such as to strike those who saw her.” Interestingly enough, Plutarch still agreed with Dio on the “irresistible charm” Cleopatra possessed. Plutarch also noted Cleopatra’s honeyed voice and talented multilingualism, which no doubt added to her appeal: “there was a sweetness also in the tones of [Cleopatra’s] voice; and her tongue, like an instrument of many strings, she could readily turn to whatever language she pleased.” Other modern-day intellectuals agree with Plutarch’s points on Cleopatra’s over-exaggerated beauty and machiavellian charm.

Stacy Schiff—an essayist, biographer, and Pulitzer Prize-winning author—said that “[Cleopatra] has a very strong chin, hooked nose very much like her father’s, and sunken eyes..” Schiff concluded by saying that Cleopatra was “no great beauty, by no means an Elizabeth Taylor look-alike.” Dio clashes with Plutarch and Schiff on this point, but they argue in harmonic unison with one another when it comes to Cleopatra’s capacity to charm. Schiff captures this sentiment perfectly when she says, “it was not [Cleopatra’s] beauty but her charisma that was the dominant quality.”

Reasonable minds may differ on these conclusions, but based on primary source findings, it is fair-minded to say that Cleopatra's political success and political achievements probably had less to do with her physical beauty and more to do with her charisma, because most evidence suggests that it was her social talents, rather than her figure, which contributed to her political success.

Refereces:

1. Dio, Roman History(XLII.34.4-6)

2. Plutarch, Life of Antony (XXVII.2-3)

Julius Caesar and Kingship

By Pierce K. Kozlowski

Did Caesar want to be acknowledged as king? Based on primary source readings, no.

Interestingly, while ancient intellectuals share a relatively broad consensus on that answer, ancient thinkers such as Cassius Dio have suggested that Caesar had covert motivations which contradicted his supposed negative position towards the crown. Cassius Dio (155-235 CE), a statesman and historian of ancient Rome, talks about how Caesar's political enemies attempted to quip Caesar and his allies by addressing him as “King.” Caesar had famously “refused” and “rebuked” this monarchical title for a time, sometimes even showing his “evident irritation” to those who persisted in addressing him by the title. As previously mentioned, however, it is likely that Caesar may have yearned for the title of King. Dio raises this very point, suggesting that, “while [Caesar] pretendedly shunned the title [King], in reality he desired to assume it.” Essentially, Dio’s account serves to highlight the possible discrepancy between Caesar's supposed public view towards the Republic, versus his alleged monarchical view towards the Republic.

While Dio’s position on Caesar is notorious throughout the halls of academia, it is not a blanketed opinion that represents the broader intellectual consensus.

Other ancient thinkers, such as Nicolaus of Damascus, have offered counter-points to Dio by investigating other aspects of Caesar's political career. Nicolaus of Damascus (64-4 BCE), a Jewish Historian and Augustan Philosopher, gives an account that diverts slightly from the account of Dio. During the notorious Lupercalia festival, Nicolaus noted the multiple consuls which attempted to crown Caesar with kingship: Lincius, Longius, and most notably, Antonius. Despite the numerous attempts by Lincius and Longius to crown Caesar, "Caesar kept rejecting it." Antonius would then go on to make two attempts to do the same: On the first one, “Caesar snatched it off and threw it into the crowd;” On the second attempt, Caesar “ordered it be taken to the temple of Capitoline Jupiter.” Intriguingly, Nicolaus then shifts focus onto Antonius, suggesting that Antonius’ attempts to crown Caesar were to “ingratiate” himself with Caesar in the hopes that Caesar would adopt him as his son. Similar to Dio, Nicolaus mentioned Caesar’s decrying of the crown. However, Nicolaus cleverly explored the motivations of Antonius, who apparently desired for Caesar’s kingship; whereas Dio myopically focused on Caesar, and Caesar’s potential double opinion regarding kingship.

Surprisingly, the two camps of thought are not diametrically opposed, as one does not seek to refute the other. However, both camps possess separate perspectives on the topic of Caesar’s broader political motivations.

In conclusion, the debate between Dio and Nicolaus centers around two perspectives. On the one hand, Dio noted that Caesar harshly rejected the efforts made to recognize him as king. By that same token, however, Dio suggested that Caesar’s public decrying of kingship was in sharp contrast to the reality; the reality being that Caesar actually had underlying motivations which, in fact, longed for and desired the crown.

On the other hand, similar to Dio, Nicolaus also made particular note of Caesar’s denial of the title king, pointing out four public instances which occurred during the Lupercalia festival. Out of respect for the counsels of the gods, Caesar even orders the wreath that Antonius tried to crown him with to be put in the temple of Capitoline Jupiter. In lieu of arguing that Caesar had despotic motivations that were hidden from the public eye like Dio, Nicolaus instead puts Antonius under the microscope for analysis after his two bold attempts to crown Caesar at the Lupercalia festival. Nicolaus ultimately concluded that Antonius sought to crown Caesar because he desired to gain favor in Caesar’s eyes, most likely in the hopes to become adopted as his son.

Based on these readings alone, it could be logically concluded that either Caesar, in truth, may have had surreptitious motivations for the crown and masked them; or that Caesar was, in fact, appalled by the Roman Crown, but interestingly, Antonius attempted to crown Caesar regardless in the hopes of potential adoption from Caesar. The double interpretation is important as not one answer alone can be satisfied by the evidence. Therefore, granting equal weight and possibility to both answers without partially favoring one for the other is a sufficient conclusion to reach given the available readings and resources.

References

1. Cassius Dio, 44.8-11, trans. By H. B. Foster, pp. 414-417, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1961.

2. Nicolaus of Damascus, Life of Augustus, 19-22, trans. By Clayton M. Hall (Menascha, WI: George Banta, 1923).